The Texas Supreme Court’s grant list, which officially identifies which petitions for review the justices have chosen to hear, reveals more than the questions it plans to answer. It reveals what the court thinks needs answering—and tells practitioners where the legal ground is shifting.

The remaining 2026 docket reflects at least five institutional trends: a push to transform Rule 91a into a meaningful gatekeeping tool, aggressive policing of sovereign-immunity boundaries, a gravitational pull toward bright-line rules in contract damages and risk allocation, and a breadth of subject-matter engagement that signals institutional confidence. Each trend carries practical implications for how Texas lawyers advise clients, draft agreements, and try cases.

A. MANDAMUS AS STRUCTURAL REFORMS.

Several pending cases look like narrow procedural disputes. But taken together, they reflect something larger: the court’s trend of using mandamus not merely to correct isolated errors but to impose structural clarity on the trial court system.

Start with Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91a. Many trial courts remain reluctant to grant dismissals, and Texas appellate courts have reinforced that reluctance by warning that Rule 91a “provides a harsh remedy” and “should be strictly construed.” But the Supreme Court has pushed back, insisting earlier this year dismissals must issue to “spare private parties and the public the time and money utterly wasted enduring eventual reversal.” The court’s acceptance of three more mandamus petitions challenging Rule 91a denials suggests it views lower-court resistance as a systemic problem worth correcting—not a series of isolated errors.

The cases span the full spectrum. In re Simon Property Group (No. 25-1056) tests whether Rule 91a can dismiss premises liability claims arising from the 2023 Allen Premium Outlets mass shooting. The owners argue no duty to protect against a lone-wolf terrorist attack exists as a matter of law under the court’s framework in Timberwalk Apartments, Partners, Inc. v. Cain. In re Liberty County Mutual Insurance Co. (No. 25-0932) arrives from the opposite end of the tort spectrum. The plaintiff alleges the insurer secretly contacted her treating provider and negotiated reduced medical charges, thereby lowering her recoverable damages before her personal injury claim could reach trial. The insurer and its adjuster say no recognized cause of action supports the claim; the plaintiff responds that Rule 91a demands legal impossibility—not novelty. And In re Ford Motor Co. (No. 25-0865) presents a narrower, but equally interesting, question: whether a consumer can sue an automobile manufacturer for a dealership technician’s diagnosis and prescribed repairs for an out-of-warranty vehicle when the Occupations Code prohibits manufacturers from performing repair services. That the court took all three signals an intent to define Rule 91a’s ceiling, not merely correct its floor.

The court is also reshaping trial mechanics. In re Hughey (No. 25-0463) will decide whether AI-assisted deposition transcription complies with Texas law. The relator says the Rules of Civil Procedure have authorized non-stenographic transcriptions, and the Legislature’s 2023 amendments confirm it. The real party in interest says Government Code chapter 154 mandates certified shorthand reporters. Multiple amici on both sides have weighed in. The court’s answer will determine whether Texas litigants can use AI technology to reduce discovery costs—or whether court reporters retain a statutory monopoly—and have implications for the thousands of non-stenographic depositions already taken.

In re Delta Equine Center (No. 25-0340) tests trial court’s power after it declared a mistrial and sanctioned defense counsel $126,590 for violating a limine order by asking a witness about an already-admitted document that mentioned insurance. Relators say no limine order was ever entered; the real party in interest swore under oath one existed. Every trial lawyer who has relied on an unwritten understanding from a pretrial conference should pay attention.

And In re Bosco (No. 25-0485) asks the court to articulate—for the first time—the evidentiary showing required for a property inspection under Rule 196.7. Bosco’s neighbors sued over alleged deed-restriction violations and obtained an order allowing an inspection of her entire 14-acre homestead. She contends homestead rights demand heightened scrutiny, but her neighbors counter that Rule 196.7 imposes no such requirement.

The court’s willingness to hear oral argument on each of these mandamus petitions suggests it views procedural mandamus as a vehicle for systemic reform, not just error correction.

B. POLICING SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY FROM EVERY DIRECTION.

Fresh off its 2025 decision in City of Houston v. Gomez, 716 S.W.3d 161, the court turns again to the Tort Claims Act. Dallas County v. Leonard (No. 26-0128) tests the emergency exception found in section 101.055(2): Did a courtesy patrol officer react to an emergency when he rear-ended the plaintiff after purportedly noticing a stalled car several lanes away? While the Dallas Court of Appeals found a fact issue, a vigorous dissent called the burden-allocation framework a “quagmire” needing “additional guidance from the legislature or a higher court.” The Supreme Court seems poised to provide it.

And Medina v. Texas Department of Transportation (No. 25-0429) asks the court to resolve whether an uncovered drainage opening hidden in tall grass 15 feet from a highway right-of-way constitutes a “special defect.” The answer could redefine the spatial and functional limits of that narrow doctrine.

Comprehensive Training Center, LLC v. Edcouch-Elsa Independent School District (No. 24-0772) will determine whether a superintendent’s unbudgeted contingency-fee contracts qualify as “properly executed” under Local Government Code chapter 271. The appellate court said no, and if the court agrees, its ruling will have sweeping ramifications. Local governmental entities routinely enter contingency-fee arrangements precisely because they cost nothing up front; every city, county, and school district engaging consultants on a success-fee basis will feel the effect.

Finally, in ACS State Healthcare, LLC v. M&M Orthodontics, P.A. (No. 24-0802) the court will determine whether a private Texas Medicaid contractor inherits the state’s sovereign immunity. The Austin Court of Appeals said the contractor operated as an independent contractor, and the plaintiffs’ fraud claims were independent of state action. The question implicates every public-private partnership in Texas: If contractors inherit the state’s immunity, injured parties lose access to the courthouse; alternatively, the state cannot insulate its delegates merely by signing a contract.

The court granting these cases in a single term is not a coincidence. It is a signal. The court is actively patrolling the boundaries of the Legislature’s limited statutory waivers and probing them from markedly different angles.

C. BRIGHT-LINE RULES VERSUS FACT-INTENSIVE STANDARDS.

Three contract-damages cases on the court’s docket share a common feature: a litigant asks the court to replace a fact-intensive inquiry with a categorical rule.

In Quanteum Plas LLC v. Hospital Internists of Austin, P.A. (No. 25-0579), a jury awarded $4.5 million in lost profits for violations of a staffing contract’s compliance with law clause and tortious interference with its non-solicitation clause. The appellate court held a conspiracy claim cannot be an independent source of damages and reduced the award, but the staffing companies seek a bright-line rule that a plaintiff can never recover lost profits on contract terminable at will beyond the notice period. Chamberlain, Hrdlicka, White, Williams & Aughtry, P.C. v. ESL Ventures, LLC (No. 24-0825) underscores a different ambiguity: when a directed verdict on liability leaves its scope unwritten, who decides the measure of damages—the judge or the jury? Despite a directed verdict on breach, Houston’s First Court of Appeals held the charge properly left the key factual question of which contractual termination fee applied to the jury. And Lattimore Materials Corp. v. Trinity Industries Leasing Co. (No. 24-0953) asks when limitations begin to run on a contractual reimbursement obligation: when performance is demanded and refused—as the appellate court decided—or when the underlying damage occurs. The court’s decisions may reshape how Texas lawyers draft indemnity, reimbursement, and termination clauses and how they calculate damages at trial.

D. WORKERS’ COMPENSATION, OFFSETS, PROPORTIONATE RESPONSIBILITY, AND INSURANCE.

Two cases at the intersection of workers’ compensation and insurance law could reshape risk allocation. Morris v. Old Republic Insurance Co. (No. 24-1034) presents an apparent first-impression question: how to calculate the “employer responsibility offset” under Labor Code section 417.001(b). The Tyler Court of Appeals held that the offset equals the actual dollar reduction in each claimant’s recovery caused by the employer’s apportioned fault, and no offset applies when pretrial settlements—rather than the employer’s fault—eliminated recovery entirely. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Lexington Insurance Co. (No. 25-0410) tests whether workers’ compensation and employer-liability policy exclusions bar Exxon’s $25 million claim—despite an arbitration award finding Exxon an additional insured. While the Beaumont Court of Appeals held that Exxon’s owner-controlled insurance program made it a statutory employer under the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, the court’s ultimate answer will have enormous practical consequences for the energy and construction industries across Texas.

E. INSTITUTIONAL CONFIDENCE ACROSS THE DOCKET.

The court’s remaining docket confirms its comfort exercising authority across the full range of Texas law.

Morath v. Texas State Teachers Association (No. 25-0483) asks whether a Texas Education Agency rule can extinguish by regulation the very grievance rights the Legislature conferred by statute, as found by the Austin Court of Appeals. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 278 v. Corpus Christi Independent School District (No. 25-0182) raises the analogous question at the local level: does a school board’s prevailing wage determination survive judicial scrutiny despite the statute’s finality provision?

United Methodist Rio Texas Conference v. Alice First Methodist Church (No. 25-1086) brings the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine face to face with the church disaffiliation wave. San Patricio County Appraisal District v. Devon Gas Services, L.P. (No. 26-0153) and San Patricio County Appraisal District v. Gunvor USA LLC (No. 26-0157) will decide if crude oil stored in coastal tank farms and destined for export is exempt from ad valorem taxation under the Import-Export Clause. In re Matter of L.H. (No. 25-0229) tests the evidentiary burden to transfer a minor to adult criminal court. In re Estate of Long (No. 25-0601) examines whether a bequest to trusts that terminated before the testator’s death lapses and passes intestate. Orleans Harbour Homeowners Association & West Harbour LLC (No. 24-1083) gives the court the chance to resolve a split: whether easement by estoppel requires a vendor-vendee relationship. Zady v. Arredondo & Franklin Engineering (No. 25-0374) asks how narrowly the certificate of merit statute’s “same area” requirement applies to claims against engineers. And in a certified question from the Fifth Circuit, Canada v. Sherman (No. 26-0127) examines whether an LLC membership interest is exempt from a federal bankruptcy estate.

F. WHAT THE DOCKET MEANS FOR PRACTITIONERS.

The common thread is not any single area of law but rather the court’s posture: a willingness to accept hard cases, to impose structural clarity on lower courts, and to prefer categorical rules over open-ended standards. Five implications follow.

First, if you are defending a claim that lacks a legal basis, file a Rule 91a motion—no matter how sympathetic the plaintiff. Second, review your clients’ government contracts, contingency-fee arrangements, and insurance programs now. Third, examine damages models and get clear rulings on the record before and during trial. Fourth, audit your client’s insurance policy exclusions and educate yourself on offset and proportionate responsibility now. Fifth, follow the court’s docket for the case that touches your practice area; the court’s appetite for hard questions means your issue may be next.

Prudent lawyers will not wait for the court to issue its opinions. They will adjust now—because the grant list is the court telling you what is coming.

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